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An assessment of competing policy considerations in cases of psychiatric injury 
resulting from negligence 
 
Dr Des Butler
*
  
Since liability for psychiatric injury was first recognised, it has been evident that the extent of recovery has 
been shaped by considerations of 'policy', in the sense of societal concerns external to the demands of the 
case at hand. Some of these considerations may be explained in terms of outdated understandings concerning 
the relevant damage, while others may be regarded as being of continued significance. This article seeks to 
examine policy considerations which have been asserted as being relevant to the question of the appropriate 
extent of liability for psychiatric injury, and seeks to determine their continued legitimacy against the stan-
dard of modern knowledge and understandings in psychiatric medicine. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd
1
 illustrated that the members of the High Court are divided on the appropriate ap-
proach to the determination of a duty of care in novel cases involving pure economic loss. However, their 
Honours did confirm a trend commenced relatively recently of overtly considering and balancing relevant 
policy considerations.
2
 Cases concerning the appropriate limit of liability for psychiatric injury have demon-
strated that they are also a class with a particular susceptibility to the influence of policy considerations.
3
 
With the issue once again before the High Court, it is timely to explore the policy concerns that have been 
identified as being of influence in this area and to subject them to a systematic assessment so as to form a 
view concerning their continued legitimacy. 
Before embarking upon this task, it is worthwhile making a number of observations concerning the use of 
policy in the determination of a duty of care. First, the essential function of policy in the common law is to 
bring into judicial consideration the broader social interest of the public at large.
4
 Secondly, the concept of 
policy is value laden: any given policy stands for certain values or a sense of morality with which we intend 
or expect most of society to abide.
5
 Thirdly, while policy may no longer be an unruly horse which judges 
should be reluctant to mount,
6
 it is nevertheless not a 'Pegasus that might soar beyond the momentary needs 
of the community'.
7
 Policy therefore reflects contemporary values: thus as society develops, its values may 
change and with them the expectations of the collective welfare that forms public policy. The public policy 
of today therefore need not necessarily be the same as that of yesterday.
8
 In this sense, reference to policy 
considerations when considering the scope of liability may be seen as a tool or device by which the law may 
keep itself relevant to modern times. Fourthly, a court is naturally limited in relation to the type of public 
consideration that it is able to take into account: the adversarial process lacks the sources of information and 
means of inquiry available to, for example, a parliament.
9
 This is, however, no justification for failing to take 
external matters into account.
10
 Finally, evaluation of relevant policy considerations does not involve a court 
exercising an unfettered discretion. A judge is not a 'knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal 
of beauty or of goodness'.
11
 Instead, as Windeyer J in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey cautioned, 'courts must  
...  act in company and not alone'.
12
 
 
2.  A useful standard: Modern psychiatric knowledge 
A systematic assessment requires a defensible standard. The standard adopted in this article is modern psy-
chiatric knowledge. The reason for adopting this standard lies in the basic notion that the law should be in-
formed by its context. Law is an instrument of society, a means to an end, not an end in itself. As society 
changes, so must the instruments which regulate it.
13
 The law would fall into disrepute if courts sought to 
determine disputes in the 2000s by concepts and standards suited to the 1890s or 1940s.
14
 This is particularly 
important in an area so dependent upon a science such as knowledge and understanding in psychiatric medi-
cine, which is constantly advancing. Oliver Wendell Holmes once stressed the importance of showing 'the 
  
rational connection between your fact and the frame of the universe. To be master of any branch of knowl-
edge you must master those which lie next to it.'
15
 This entreaty has been interpreted not so much in its literal 
sense of advocating that complete mastery of one branch of knowledge is not possible without complete 
mastery of those that touch upon it, but rather as showing that 'knowledge of any given subject or the ap-
proach to any given problem is immeasurably enriched if one does not shut off one's knowledge and interest 
as one reaches the peripheries of one's discipline'.
16
 Where there is an interconnectedness between branches 
of knowledge there is mutual benefit by each being informed by the other and the interface being used to its 
full advantage.
17
  
Modern psychiatric medicine accepts that the aetiology of trauma involves the interaction of a person's char-
acteristics (including age, state of health, previous experiences, any prior trauma, and personality factors); 
the traumatic event (the stressor); and the recovery environment that follows the event (including the avail-
ability and use of social supports).
18
 Notwithstanding the individualism of personality and other characteris-
tics, clinical observation and field studies have shown that many persons exposed to traumatic events exhibit 
patterned behaviour. The properties of that behaviour, as distinguished from the content of individual think-
ing, can identify the phases in response to traumatic events in a way that allows a generalisation across dif-
ferent types of events, and even to a large extent across different types of people and different cultures.
19
 A 
widely accepted model
20
 is that proposed by the US psychologist Mardi Horowitz, comprising phases of out-
cry (such as fear or sadness), denial, intrusion (such as unbidden thoughts of the event), working through, 
and completion (resumption of life).
21
 Grief and bereavement processes are also seen to follow a more or less 
predictable course and have a similar prototypical course of resolution.
22
  
It is acknowledged that no individual necessarily fits the Horowitz prototype. There also may not be any 
sharply defined interface between one phase and another. Working through, for example, may involve as-
pects of denial and intrusion. Also, the intrusive phase may precede or even alternate with the denial phase.
23
 
For most people, however, the reactive processes after a traumatic event settle and homeostatic equilibrium is 
recovered.
24
 The typical pattern following even catastrophic experiences is resolution of symptoms rather 
than development of a disorder.
25
 In only comparatively few cases do reactions continue into the develop-
ment of mental disorder.
26
 
It should be noted that recent studies have challenged the Horowitz model of a process of adaptation. In par-
ticular, one theory holds that once certain biological systems are hyperaroused, depleted, or deregulated, 
other metabolic functions aimed at restoring equilibrium may be set in motion. A consequence of this process 
may be that it is difficult to psychologically process stress in a manner that leads towards adaptation.
27
 Some 
have suggested that rather than a normative process of adaptation, there is a distinct set of biological altera-
tions that characterise a state of prolonged or persistent symptoms in response to a traumatic event.
28
 In any 
event, detection of biological abnormalities may hold the hope of corroborating the legitimacy of claims of at 
least post-traumatic stress disorder and may ultimately allow prompt identification and evaluation of chronic 
symptoms, enable an accurate prognosis and lessen reliance on subjective assessments.
29
 
 
3.  Relevant policy considerations 
Different policy considerations are relevant to different categories of case: the policy considerations that help 
shape the extent of liability for psychiatric injury are not necessarily the same as those that are relevant to, 
for example, liability for pure economic loss. Further, within the broad spectrum of psychiatric injury cases, 
different policy considerations may be considered relevant. In its report Liability for Psychiatric Illness, the 
English Law Commission identified six 'policy arguments' that may be posed as being grounds for limitation 
of liability, viz: 
 
o  the possibility of a 'flood of claims'; 
o  the potential for fraud; 
o  the potential for conflicting medical opinions; 
  
o  the notion that psychiatric illness is not worthy of compensation; 
o  the notion that the plaintiff is only a 'secondary' victim; and 
o  the potential for litigation to affect prognosis.
30
 
This article considers those 'heads' of policy that have been regarded in the past and present as influencing 
the way liability for psychiatric injury should be circumscribed. It is not limited to those considerations iden-
tified by the English Law Commission. It should also be noted that any collection of relevant policy concerns 
is not a closed domain: it is possible for a court to be confronted with a novel case that brings into play a 
policy consideration that hitherto has not featured in previous cases.
31
 It would prove an endless and unnec-
essary task to attempt to conceive of and prejudge in advance every possible policy consideration that might 
militate for or against liability in the infinite variety of cases. For present purposes perhaps the best that can 
be achieved is to acknowledge the possibility of 'other policy considerations'. 
 
3.1 Practical justice 
The first group of policy considerations that is relevant in the psychiatric injury sphere reflect what Lord 
Goff described in another context as an 'impulse to do practical justice'.
32
 'Practical justice' is a loose descrip-
tion but may denote those factors relevant to the fairness or justice in practice of allowing or denying recov-
ery by a particular plaintiff. For present purposes it may be seen as including three considerations: vindica-
tion of damage to the person, and the two goals of treating like claimants alike and of achieving a sufficient 
degree of certainty to enable litigants and their advisers to be able to predict outcomes. These latter two con-
cerns may in practice entail a measure of tension since in a given case they may tend to pull in opposite di-
rections.  
 
3.1.1 Vindication of injury to the self 
In a complex and interwoven society, it is inevitable that the activities of one will invade the lives of another 
or others.
33
 In past cases where the defendant has been held to be at fault, the law has shown little compunc-
tion in recognising a plaintiff's physical integrity as an interest worthy of protection. Indeed, as Lord Oliver 
has observed, 'the infliction of physical injury to the person  ...  universally requires to be justified'.
34
 Jane 
Stapleton has described proper vindication of the law's concern with the physical security of persons and 
property as a 'trump' factor.
35
 
As the law has been progressively enlightened by advances in medical knowledge, injury to one's psychic 
wellbeing has been recognised as being as deleterious, in some cases more so, than injury to physical well-
being.
36
 A sound mind in a damaged body may be capable of achieving much, while a damaged mind in a 
sound body may be capable of achieving little. The integrity of the psyche should therefore be as worthy of 
protection as the integrity of the physical condition. They are but two species of personal injury.
37
 Mental 
injuries should not, on the whole, be an incident of living in a complex functioning society which sufferers 
are expected to endure without any hope of reparation.
38
  
Nor is the fact that in some cases the psychiatric injury is a reaction to the physical injury or imperilment of 
another -- and in that sense is 'secondary' -- properly a ground for denigrating claims for psychiatric injury. It 
has long been acknowledged that any such actions for psychiatric injury and for any physical injury are in-
dependent.
39
 There is no basis therefore for suggesting that the claim for psychiatric injury is in some way 
derived from, and therefore in some way inferior to, the claim for physical injury.
40
 As distinct actions, each 
should be assessed on its own merits rather than on the basis of an imperfect deduction that since one injury 
is regarded as in some way more serious than another, the second does not warrant compensation. 
While an interest in psychic wellbeing is now widely recognised as deserving of protection, the degree of 
harm necessary is a separate issue. In Anglo-Australian law, the courts have been satisfied with a require-
ment that the plaintiff suffer a 'recognisable psychiatric illness' or its equivalent, whereas different ap-
proaches have been taken in different US jurisdictions, such as a willingness to compensate 'serious mental 
  
distress' or emotional distress that is objectively or physically manifested.
41
 The Anglo-Australian require-
ment is sometimes contrasted with more transient emotions such as 'ordinary grief or sorrow'.
42
 Limiting re-
covery to longer-lasting, more deleterious conditions -- conditions which might conveniently be described as 
'pathological reactions' -- may be sufficient to dispel the policy concerns sometimes raised in the United 
States that compensating mental distress will enable plaintiffs to recover for mere trivial afflictions.
43
 It 
might be justifiably argued that trivial afflictions are merely incidents of living, which sufferers should have 
to bear as best they can: the law is only one technique for coping with and ameliorating the effects of life's 
adversities, and people should be discouraged from using it when some other way of coping would be just as 
good or better.
44
 
The impulse to do justice by compensating a person who has had his or her psychic integrity disrupted by the 
defendant's conduct with serious, debilitating effects is a substantial impetus in favour of the imposition of 
liability. Lord Bridge indicated that he would require strong arguments before leaving a loss to fall upon an 
innocent victim, remarking that 'it is well to remember that we are concerned only with the question of liabil-
ity of a defendant who is, ex hypothesi, guilty of fault in causing the death, injury or danger, which has in 
turn triggered the psychiatric illness'.
45
  
 
3.1.2 Like cases alike 
Most substantive theories of justice emphasise a concept of justice as equality.
46
 In other words, fairness and 
justice dictate that parties in similar situations should be treated similarly unless there is some significant and 
relevant difference between them: the law should not act capriciously in relation to persons in like positions. 
A corollary is that litigants are entitled to expect that if an aggrieved person is allowed to recover compensa-
tion in one set of circumstances, a similarly aggrieved party in similar circumstances is entitled to expect that 
he or she will also recover. Arbitrary demarcation of liability is seen as producing incongruous and indefen-
sible results.
47
 
Not infrequently, however, courts have chosen to act pragmatically rather than as a matter of logic, and im-
posed limits to liability that may be arbitrary.
48
 In the context of psychiatric injury, 'bright lines' of liability 
have been justified by reference to countervailing concerns such as the perception of the possibility of fraud 
or disproportionate or boundless liability.
49
 Acknowledging the artificiality of choosing between competing 
approaches has led some judges to seek the 'less arbitrary' as being the 'less unjust' and therefore more desir-
able.
50
 
The notion of similarity has an inherent difficulty: in a way no two cases are exactly alike. The issue is what 
constitutes a 'significant and relevant' difference. Arbitrariness, in the sense of the failure to deal in a consis-
tent manner with cases that appear to be the same, is a matter of perception. Even the definition of the dam-
age deemed compensable involves a measure of arbitrary choice.
51
 A limitation of liability that is supported 
by an accepted policy argument might be called 'arbitrary' if it is narrower or even broader than the policy 
suggests it should be. However, any given limitation will rarely be the focus of only one policy considera-
tion. A limitation that is the subject of a number of policy concerns may appear arbitrary when measured 
against one of those concerns, but as a compromise among competing and inconsistent policies the limitation 
might overall be justifiable.
52
 
Treating like cases alike may also be invoked in a negative fashion, with the result of denying recovery. This 
is reflected in the obtuse reasoning of several members of the House of Lords in White v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire Police.
53
 Following in the wake of an imposition of arbitrary distinctions in Alcock v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police  that allowed the law to capriciously choose between claims by rela-
tives of the victims of the Hillsborough disaster, Lords Hoffmann and Steyn were moved by the prospect that 
an 'ordinary person'
54
 or 'man on the Underground'
55
 might think it: 
 
  
unfair between one class of claimants and another, at best not treating like cases alike and, at 
worst, favouring the less deserving against the more deserving. He would think it wrong that 
policemen, even as part of a general class of persons who rendered assistance, should have the 
right to compensation for psychiatric injury out of public funds while the bereaved relatives are 
sent away with nothing.
56
 
 
Such a result, it was suggested, would be against the ordinary person's 'notions of distributive justice'.
57
 
However, it might be queried whether the experience of the relatives -- losing a loved one -- was truly 'alike' 
that of the police -- being confronted by a disaster involving large-scale loss of life.
58
 Even leaving that ques-
tion aside, perhaps such an argument would have been more persuasive had the Law Lords asked whether it 
would offend the 'ordinary person' to deny recovery in the first place to a relative who, perforce of circum-
stances rather than by choice, could only confirm the loss of their loved one by, for example, seeing his or 
her body in a mortuary, outside some arbitrary 'aftermath' period. 
It may not be possible to do practical justice for plaintiffs by removing all arbitrary distinctions or limita-
tions. However, removal of unnecessarily arbitrary distinctions based on spurious grounds should minimise 
instances of the law capriciously choosing between otherwise worthy claims. Take, for example, the diagno-
sis of post-traumatic stress disorder in the commonly used diagnostic instrument, the fourth revision of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). This diagnosis provides as follows: 
The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present:  
 
(1)  the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical 
integrity of self or others 
(2)  the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in chil-
dren, this may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behaviour. 
 
In the narrative adjacent to the diagnosis, the manual states that being 'confronted with an event' includes but 
is not limited to learning about the violent personal assault, serious accident, or serious injury experienced by 
a family member or a close friend; learning about the sudden, unexpected death of a family member or close 
friend; or learning that one's child has a life-threatening disease.
59
 This diagnosis may therefore be applied to 
the same symptoms suffered whether, for example, the plaintiff personally perceived the accident or its af-
termath or was instead 'confronted' by a third party communication about the accident. The sense of loss re-
mains the same.
60
 Accordingly, a limitation based on the means of perception would impose an arbitrary dis-
tinction without medical legitimacy and may result in the law capriciously distinguishing between otherwise 
meritorious claims. 
 
3.1.3 Predictability 
Another form of arbitrariness arises where a rule is stated vaguely and gives insufficient guidance to both 
courts and litigants. No rule can be so stated that all uncertainty is removed: vagueness is a relative notion. 
However, the more uncertainty in a rule, the less a court is constrained by the rule and the more it is left to its 
own predilections. To observers, although perhaps not the court making the decision, such a resolution may 
appear more as an ad hoc exercise than an adherence to a generally accepted rule.
61
 Sufficient certainty to 
enable some degree of predictability so that litigants and their advisers may make some assessment as to the 
relative chances of their cases is a matter not only of fairness to the parties but also the overall administration 
of justice.
62
 As Brennan J remarked, 'the law of negligence should be capable of application in solicitors' of-
fices'.
63
 People should know where they stand: they should be able to have some measure of assuredness in 
the state of the law to enable them to order their affairs on the basis of what their rights are rather than need-
ing to await a court determination of what their rights were. 
  
The desire for certainty or predictability has been placed higher by some courts than concerns such as the 
prospect of arbitrarily excluding some claims.
64
 That attitude is not, however, universally held.
65
 As McHugh 
J recently observed, while the needs of the litigant, legal adviser and trial judge should guide the formulation 
of applicable principles, this 'does not mean  ...  that the common law must adopt arbitrary "bright-line" 
rules for the sake of certainty at the expense of what most people including judges would regard as a desir-
able result'.
66
  
Whatever its desirability in other areas of the law, such as that dealing with commercial transactions,
67
 in an 
area involving matters of fact and degree such as psychiatric injury,
68
 certainty is a valuable servant but a 
dangerous master. Recognising that psychiatric medicine is in some, but not all, ways still an imprecise sci-
ence, such degree of certainty as practicable nevertheless is a matter that warrants accommodation in any 
proposed approach to determining the appropriate extent of liability. 
 
3.2 Proof of damage 
There have been at least three manifestations of concerns relating to the proof of the requisite damage where 
the damage is psychiatric injury: suspicions concerning the genuineness of claims, perceived difficulties in 
assessing damages for such intangible damage, and the phenomenon known as 'compensation neurosis'.  
 
3.2.1 Genuineness of claims 
One of the policy grounds cited by the Privy Council in Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas
69
 for 
denial of all claims for 'nervous or mental shock' was the difficulty of proof and the fear of 'a wide field [be-
ing] open for imaginary claims'. Medical literature indicates that the heyday for feigned psychiatric illness 
was shortly before and after World War I,
70
 but even the diagnostic instrument DSM-IV advises psychiatrists 
to be alert to the possibility to this day.
71
 Equally problematic is self-deception, prompting one Massachusetts 
court to express its wonder at 'the tricks that the human mind can play upon itself'.
72
 
The essential problem that has been perceived, therefore, is one of the difficulty of proof.
73
 Many courts have 
met the danger by requiring physical manifestation or of objective proof of emotional distress as a precondi-
tion to recovery.
74
 In early times, however, some US jurisdictions were prepared to recognise exceptional 
cases where emotional distress alone would be compensated, the guarantee of genuineness of the claim being 
provided by the circumstances in which the distress was caused, such as the negligent handling of corpses.
75
 
This caution may be measured against early signs of altruism, combined with faith in the judicial system, 
demonstrated by some judges such as Kennedy J in Dulieu v White & Sons.
76
 The genuineness of claims has 
been acknowledged as being, in the final analysis, a question of fact for the judge and jury to determine on a 
case-by-case basis,
77
 with the adversarial process an important factor:
78
 'factual, legal, and medical charlatans 
are unlikely to emerge from a trial unmasked.'
79
 
Allied with the law's confidence in its own systems to detect fraud, has been the marked advances in medical 
science and psychiatric techniques since the Coultas decision in 1888. As Kirby P has pointed out, there is no 
warrant today for a court to exhibit the same resistance and antipathy that the claims for psychiatric injury 
attracted in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
80
 In any event, it has been recognised that the risk of fabri-
cated claims is not a problem solely confined to the field of claims for psychiatric injury. Any intangible 
damage provides an opportunity for attempted deception: certain physical injuries, such as a bad back, are as 
susceptible, if not more susceptible, to fraud as a complex neurosis.
81
  
For some, the involvement of expert testimony has been transformed from a positive reassurance concerning 
proof of the relevant damage into a policy consideration warranting restriction of recovery.
82
 However, it is 
common for courts to be called upon to choose between conflicting expert evidence in a wide range of cases, 
including construction and engineering litigation and claims involving some physical injuries. There is no 
justification for singling out claims for psychiatric injury for special treatment in this respect.
83
 
  
However legitimate the Privy Council's fears of imaginary claims may have been in 1888, the altruistic ap-
proach heralded in Dulieu in 1901 combined with the faith in the judicial system and the great advances in 
medical knowledge lead to a conclusion that in Australia today it should be accorded much less significance 
as a relevant policy concern than it was in a bygone era.
84
 
 
3.2.2 Ability to assess damages 
Lord Wensleydale once generalised that 'mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to 
redress, when the lawful act complained of causes that alone'.
85
 Basically, the argument was that damages for 
mental injury could not be ascertained with any degree of certainty and that therefore no court could with 
confidence assign a definite monetary value for the injury.
86
 Instead, it was suggested that any assessment 
must be based on mere risk, conjecture or speculation.
87
 The simplest response to this argument may be to 
recognise that there is an inherent uncertainty in a tort system which attempts to restore the plaintiff to the 
position he or she occupied prior to an accident through the medium of a monetary award. Also, the law has 
no qualms in compensating other intangible losses that are no less uncertain than psychiatric injury, such as 
physical pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life, loss of amenities and enjoyment of life and loss of 
consortium,
88
 as well as compensating torts such as assault, false imprisonment and defamation.
89
  
If it is accepted that modern medicine is able to detect and suggest treatment of psychiatric conditions, there 
would appear to be no reason why psychiatric injury should not be treated in the same way as physical injury 
in terms of assessing both general and special damages.
90
 The appropriate approach may be to 'look at the 
human being in question and seek to consider what is appropriate for the damage that has been done to 
[him/]her and to [his/]her way of life, and to assess an appropriate amount'.
91
 
There may even be merit in the notion of an influential tariff, although it has been pointed out that the High 
Court has resisted such an idea in personal injury claims on the basis that no two injuries are the same.
92
 
There would be a danger linking a tariff to diagnoses in instruments such as DSM-IV,
93
 since such diagnoses 
are not indicative of specific entities, in the same way as an epithet such as 'a broken femur' may be said to 
be. There is no such 'thing' as, for example, a post-traumatic stress disorder, only a presentation of symptoms 
that might conveniently attract that label. There is a variability inherent not only in diagnoses (the symptoms 
attracting post-traumatic stress disorder may range from mild to severe effects) but also in cross-diagnoses. 
For example, following a reassessment of diagnostic indicia, symptoms resulting from damage to property 
that would have attracted a diagnosis of 'post-traumatic stress disorder' under the previous edition of the 
DSM (DSM-IIIR) are now likely to attract a diagnosis of 'adjustment disorder' under DSM-IV. The stressor 
and symptoms have not changed, merely the label applied for clinical purposes. Nevertheless, 'adjustment 
disorder' is a diagnosis that might also be applied to symptoms suffered in circumstances which are not con-
sidered by the law as warranting compensation, such as those resulting from changed life circumstances like 
divorce, financial difficulties or change of job. For this reason, the diagnosis of adjustment disorder would 
presumably rank lower than post-traumatic stress disorder (as now defined) for the purposes of any tariff. 
Thus, while the symptoms and their effect on the plaintiff may have remained the same, due to the change of 
label the applicable compensation would be different. The DSM is designed for clinical diagnosis and treat-
ment, not for grading reactions for the purposes of differential compensation. Any tariff would therefore need 
to be based on a catalogue of effects, not labels that may be inconsistently applied.  
Since assessment of damages for psychiatric injury is, or should be, treated in the same fashion as assessment 
of damages for physical injury, those damages are subject to the normal rules such as the plaintiff's duty to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate the damage, although the plaintiff's idiosyncrasies may be relevant when 
adjudging the reasonableness of the efforts to mitigate.
94
 In the psychiatric injury context this rule might 
come into play, in an appropriate case, where there is a refusal to seek psychotherapy and it is clear that such 
therapy would speed up recovery and the plaintiff is advised accordingly. This may include a case where a 
plaintiff has had pre-trauma education or training, which has alerted him or her to the symptoms of stress 
reactions and a means of alleviating or overcoming those symptoms. Moreover, the award is subject to a 
  
discount on account of the vicissitudes of life. Where the plaintiff has an existing condition that predisposes 
him or her to psychiatric injury, a discount must be made for damage that might have been suffered even in 
the absence of the defendant's negligence.
95
  
 
3.2.3 Compensation neurosis 
The preceding observation concerning assessment of damages may also sufficiently accommodate the phe-
nomenon known as 'compensation neurosis'. Compensation neurosis was first recognised soon after the Prus-
sian government introduced legislation in the 1870s to compensate railway accident victims.
96
 As long as it 
remains unclear whether or how much compensation the patient will receive, he or she may be inclined to 
maintain the sick role, focus on it and even emphasise it since he or she may believe that the more sick he or 
she appears the greater the prospective gain. Also, until litigation is finalised the entire situation remains un-
resolved: because of the uncertainty, individuals may be unable to emotionally accept the situation, adapt and 
go on living as effectively as they can, and continued discussion of the case during the process of litigation 
may keep alive the various feelings, resentments and hurts.
97
 An individual's sense of vulnerability and vic-
timisation may be exacerbated by an adversarial system which pits an individual against a defendant, who 
may already be viewed as the enemy, and which allows aggressive cross-examination.
98
 
Compensation neurosis is not, however, a phenomenon confined to psychiatric injury. It may equally attend 
claims for physical injury where the plaintiff alleges that he or she has suffered or is suffering pain. More-
over, compensation neurosis does not arise in all cases of psychiatric injury. Why then should the risk of it 
occurring in some cases influence the extent of recovery in all  cases?
99
 Instead, in a case where compensa-
tion neurosis is seen to have occurred, it would be more rational to take account of the fact when assessing 
the appropriate measure of damages.
100
 
 
3.3 Opening the floodgates 
A frequent counter to a novel claim, not just in the context of psychiatric injury, is the argument that the 
suggested extension will inevitably lead to a proliferation of claims.
101
 Such concerns were carried into the 
field of psychiatric injury as early as the 1888 Privy Council decision in Victorian Railways Commissioners v 
Coultas.  
The fundamental concern of opening the floodgates operates on a number of levels. It is manifested in the 
administrative concern that the legal system will be inundated and will be unable to cope, the social and pub-
lic interest dimensions of whether unbridled liability will serve as an impediment to the wider activities and 
operations of a properly functioning society, and practical justice fears concerning a possible imposition of 
limitless liability.  
Although some might place little credence on floodgates arguments,
102
 they should not be automatically dis-
missed.
103
 A crucial question, as stated by Nolan LJ in the Court of Appeal in Alcock v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire Police, is the 'breadth of the terms in which the question is answered'.
104
 While unpleasant 
emotions such as fear, anxiety, grief or sorrow are a part of the human condition and are therefore ubiquitous, 
it has been noted that the cases of an individual suffering a pathological reaction to traumatic stress, in the 
sense of the individual being incapable of restoring homeostatic equilibrium due to a 'fracture of his/her psy-
chic integrity', and suffering serious and debilitating effects are relatively rare. It is a fallacy to believe, for 
example, that merely because a physically injured person has a family, every member of that family, or even 
any member of that family will necessarily suffer a pathological reaction as a result of the physical injury, 
although it is reasonable to expect that all or most members of the family might to varying degrees experi-
ence any combination of unpleasant emotions. Fears of opening the floodgates too wide should therefore be 
allayed by recognition that few will jump the first hurdle of establishing the requisite degree of injury.
105
 The 
class of plaintiffs whose pathological reactions are caused by negligent defendants is therefore properly re-
garded as 'important, though no doubt small'.
106
  
  
A further, more philosophical reason might be asserted for rebutting the application of the 'floodgates' argu-
ment to liability for psychiatric injury. It may be that fear of giving rise to a proliferation of claims originated 
in a comparison, either consciously or unconsciously, with claims for physical injury. Opening the floodgates 
to a multitude of claims was not a concern that troubled courts in determining liability for physical injury due 
to a perception that the circle of people at risk of being physically injured as a result of a defendant's act was 
necessarily limited.
107
 The 'obvious difference' between physical injury and, for example, economic loss is 
that 'a negligently made article will only cause one accident'.
108
 Applied to cases of psychiatric injury, this 
reasoning is understandable for a less sophisticated age: if a defendant drove his or her buggy or even motor 
vehicle negligently there was a limit to the number of people that could be run down. A person standing in a 
field adjacent to, but a safe distance away from, the highway would be at no risk of physical injury whereas 
such a person might nevertheless be at risk of 'nervous shock' if he or she witnessed an accident. However, in 
a more technologically advanced age this rationale may no longer be universally sound. 
Today, a relatively minor but negligent act or omission may cause widespread physical damage to property 
and/or person: an accident at a nuclear or industrial plant may result in radioactive or chemical poisoning of 
thousands if not millions of people and of vast areas of land, as illustrated by the explosion in one of the re-
actors at the nuclear plant at Chernobyl, Ukraine, on 26 April 1986 and the escape of a large quantity of 
deadly methyl isocyanate from the Union Carbide Battery Plant in Bhopal, India, on 3 December 1984. De-
fects in the production of goods may likewise physically injure a very large number of people, as has been 
alleged in the case of defective silicone breast implants. The possibility of a multitude of claims from the one 
incident is not, however, a ground on which the courts would deny relief in actions for physical injury or 
property damage caused by such an accident.
109
  
Accordingly, as was previously pointed out in relation to the question of genuineness of the claim, if the fear 
of opening the floodgates is asserted as justifying restrictions on recovery for psychiatric injury, proceeding 
on a purported contradistinction to the position pertaining to physical injury, it is without substance. What-
ever its original validity, such an argument today might be viewed as resting on an unsound foundation, in as 
much as the same concerns may be said to be equally relevant to some cases of physical injury. 
The experience has been that an expansion in the extent of liability for psychiatric injury in jurisdictions such 
as New South Wales, California and Hawaii did not result in a proliferation of claims.
110
 This is support for, 
at least, the pragmatic response suggested by Davies JA in the course of expanding liability to include psy-
chiatric injury resulting from telephone communication of an accident involving a loved one: 'The truth is we 
do not know what, if any, increase in claims any extension of the law in this area will be likely to bring. 
Nevertheless the risk of such increase may be a reason for advancing in this area cautiously and, where pos-
sible, incrementally.'
111
 It should not be a reason for not advancing at all. 
Specific observations may also be made with respect to the three manifestations of concern at increased 
claims. 
 
3.3.1 Overtaxing the legal system  
Opening the floodgates to litigation conjures up the spectre of creating an overtaxing burden for courts, 
thereby having a detrimental effect on the overall administration of justice and derivatively obstructing a so-
ciety which contemplates a properly functioning judicial system. The drain on judicial resources consequent 
upon an extension of liability is considered even more significant when viewed in light of the overall in-
creasing demand upon limited judicial resources in modern times.
112
 
Beyond the debate over the apparent or real increases in the amount of litigation, this aspect of the floodgates 
argument may be met on a more fundamental, and perhaps more compelling basis. It has been repeatedly 
declared that courts will not exclude meritorious claims no matter what burden for the judicial system results: 
'It is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground 
that it will give the courts too much work to do.'
113
 
  
 
3.3.2 Impediments to a functioning society 
A relevant question concerning any possible extension of liability is whether 'it would be too great a tax on 
the ordinary business of life'.
114
 A judicial system at risk of being clogged and overtaxed may be only one 
instrument of a functioning society that may be thought to be at risk of being detrimentally affected by a 
flood of mental injury litigation. There may be a concern that expansion of liability will cause the class of 
persons potentially affected to become circumspect in their conduct to such a degree that those activities be-
come affected, to the disadvantage of the public at large.
115
 It may be argued that, rather than thinking how 
best to render services, potential defendants would be predisposed to adopting 'defensive practices' by think-
ing firstly how best to protect themselves from possible allegations of negligence.
116
 Such observations are 
equally applicable to many service providers such as police, doctors, lawyers and teachers.
117
  
Moreover, an imposition of liability may involve diverting already stretched resources away from their in-
tended functions to instead defending litigation.
118
 Additional possible effects of a particular extension of 
liability may be that persons simply elect not to engage in the particular activities for fear of the risk of po-
tential liability.
119
 Indeed it may be claimed that an extension of liability could force the discontinuance of an 
activity altogether. For example, if recovery were permitted by even those particularly sensitive, a depart-
ment store could not even safely hold an annual sale for fear that such a person might aggravate his or her 
pre-existing mental illness when confronted by crowds of avid bargain hunters.
120
 If every person who felt 
disturbed or distressed by what he or she read in a newspaper or saw on television were entitled to recover, 
the newspaper and television proprietors might make the commercial decision that engaging in such a busi-
ness was so risky an activity that it was prohibitory.
121
 
These are strong reasons for resisting an expansion of liability. However, these concerns may again be al-
layed to some degree by reference to the comparatively low number of claims that would be expected to be 
able to meet a threshold of compensable damage fixed as a 'pathological' reaction. A further answer to the 
concern that the imposition of duty may have an adverse impact on the manner in which society conducts its 
affairs is to treat the issue more as one relating to breach of the relevant standard, rather than the existence of 
a duty of care.
122
 That would mean that rather than foreclose all claims of otherwise meritorious claimants 
against an entire class of defendants, liability would depend upon whether in the particular circumstances the 
defendant had failed to take the appropriate precautions to prevent the injury.
123
 In relation to psychiatric in-
jury, in Guay v Sun Publishing Co
124
 two of the five judges of the Supreme Court of Canada were uncon-
cerned at the prospect of a newspaper proprietor being liable for mental injury caused by a false report since 
'inquiries occupying only a few minutes would have revealed the truth',
125
 that is to say, the standard of care 
required was easily discharged. Recognition of a duty in such cases does not necessarily mean that if there is 
a psychiatric injury caused then there will be liability: the duty is as always to take reasonable care in the 
circumstances. Blanket denial of duty in all cases in which a duty could conceivably obstruct some social 
function may merely provide protection for those disposed to carry on those activities in a haphazard or 
cavalier fashion.
126
 
For some, the debate goes further and suggests that by compensating mental injury, society effectively 'pam-
pers' to the susceptible in society at the expense of 'prime movers'.
127
 Perhaps at the extreme of this argument 
is the assertion that there is 'considerable evidence' that society is pampering to the overly-sensitive, with 
people becoming more easily offended and quick to demand official vindication of perceived slights to the 
psyche as shown by 'sensitive', 'thin-skinned' people seeking to eliminate offensive qualities from advertise-
ments, television programs and films whereas a 'toughening of the mental hide is the best defence against 
assault on psychic well-being'.
128
 However, such an argument misses the point. The issue is what should be 
the limits of liability for a certain type of injury. Whatever other remedies may today be available for a 
member of a 'special interest group' who may feel insulted by something that they may have seen in an ad-
vertisement, television program or film, under Anglo-Australian law the only mental injury that is compen-
sated is a 'recognisable psychiatric illness' or pathological response. If that objective is kept in mind, the 
  
question is not one of pandering to the indulgences or sensitivities of individuals, but rather the compensation 
of an injury which has been recognised as deserving of reparation. If that degree is not suffered, any issue of 
compensation is outside the ambit of the negligence action and instead is a matter to be resolved by other 
legal avenues. 
 
3.3.3 Disproportionality or indeterminate liability 
The floodgates argument also has a practical justice dimension, in the sense that permitting wide recovery 
may result in the imposition of 'disproportionate' or 'indeterminate' liability. While these terms have been 
treated as synonymous by some, they are distinct concepts. 
 
Disproportionality 
It has been argued that to expand the boundaries of liability may expose the defendant to a 'crushing' burden 
out of all proportion to the degree of culpability. The perceived risk of disproportionate liability is present 
both in the sense of the extent of liability to an individual plaintiff and the number of potential claimants.
129
 
In support of the argument, reference is sometimes made to liability in negligence being momentary or slight 
inadvertence or misjudgment.
130
 
However, fault does not necessarily equate with moral blameworthiness.
131
 Once a defendant has been 
proved to be negligent, he or she is liable for all the damage the act of negligence inflicted on the plaintiff, 
provided it is not too remote, regardless of how large that damage may be or how slight and insignificant or 
morally forgivable the defendant's carelessness might have been. The difficulty with levelling the 'dispropor-
tion of burden' argument at liability for psychiatric injury is that unless this rule of damages is abandoned for 
all types of damage and replaced with some rule making liability proportionate to the degree of fault, there is 
no justification for abandoning it for one type of damage only. No court denies recovery for physical injury 
for fear that damages will be a crushing burden on a defendant.
132
 As Jane Stapleton has pointed out, 'it 
would be very odd if a defendant could argue in his own favour that he should not owe a duty because he had 
many victims!'.
133
 Further, if the result is out of all proportion to the defendant's fault, it can be no less out of 
proportion to the plaintiff's entire innocence.
134
 
 
Indeterminacy 
Instead, it is more persuasive to cast the fear in terms of the risk of an 'indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class'.
135
 This resolves to an issue of fairness in that a person should know 
what the law requires of him or her: liability should not be open-ended.
136
 However, as McHugh J recently 
remarked, it is not the size or number of potential claims that makes liability 'indeterminate'. Liability will 
only be indeterminate when both the likely number of claims and the nature of them cannot be realistically 
calculated.
137
 If recovery is restricted to individuals who suffer a pathological reaction after being confronted 
by an event the number of claims should be finite and identifiable. Attention has already been brought to the 
fallacy of thinking that an accident must inevitably lead to a pathological response from all, or even any, 
members of the victim's family (let alone friends and acquaintances). Similarly, although it is possible for 
trauma to be transferred -- for example, from sufferer to treating psychiatrist
138
 -- there simply does not exist 
in the case of psychiatric injury the same risk of a potentially endless 'ripple effect' of successive losses that 
attends many pure economic loss cases, and which demands the imposition of controls on the extent of liabil-
ity for such damage.
139
 
For those seeking to expand the debate to a broader issue of the capacity of the insurance industry and ulti-
mately the consumer public to cope with the increased cost of any proposed extension of liability,
140
 it is im-
portant to bear in mind that it is easy to mistake the interests of one group, especially a vocal group, as rep-
resenting the public interest and courts must be vigilant not to neglect less vocal but equally deserving inter-
ests. There may be a danger that moulding liability for a particular kind of damage according to a perception 
that expansive liability will result in an overburdening of the insurance industry effectively equates the inter-
  
ests of that industry with the public interest. Moreover, a willingness to take into account the 'plight of the 
insurance industry' when assessing the effect of the liability for mental injury is far from universal.
141
  
A significant problem inherent in attempts to gauge any adverse effect of a proposed extension on the insur-
ance industry, and thereby the public, lies in the limits of the forensic process, already alluded to: courts are 
rarely able to evaluate mere assertion and speculation.
142
 If there is in fact a crisis facing the insurance indus-
try, the appropriate place for the debate is not in a court trying to decide whether to compensate a particular 
plaintiff but rather 'the market place of ideas and public opinion and  ...  the halls of the legislatures'.
143
 
Perhaps the greatest reassurance that might be offered to the courts is the anecdotal experience in California, 
a state of large population which might be expected to generate a proportionately large number of claims, 
following the expansion of liability to unendangered bystanders in Dillon v Legg.
144
 The experience of one 
underwriter, writing 15 years after the judgment, was that it had not altered its actuarial tables to reflect li-
ability for psychiatric injury and that separate data on claims for psychiatric injury were not even kept since 
there had only been one or two claims annually since the decision.
145
 
Finally, an indeterminate liability in terms of amount is unlikely to result from a more expansive approach if 
there is a measure of circumspection in the damages awarded. In McLoughlin v O'Brian, Lord Wilberforce 
referred to 'the modest sums recovered' in previous cases.
146
 Lord Bridge reached a similar conclusion: 
'However liberally the criterion of reasonable foreseeability is interpreted, both the number of successful 
claims in this field and the quantum of damages they will attract are likely to be moderate.'
147
  
 
3.4 Other policy considerations 
The preceding survey of policy considerations that have overtly or covertly influenced the shaping of the law 
is not intended to be exhaustive of all possible concerns that may be raised in the future. Just as the law does 
not automatically close its door to a claim simply because it is a novel claim, the law should be amenable to 
the relevance of policy considerations outside those already recognised. For example, in considering whether 
a media defendant should be held liable for causing psychiatric injury by its negligence, free speech consid-
erations may be a significant factor in the determination of the existence of a duty of care.
148
 Alternatively, in 
another context, the potential expansion of liability in negligence into the settled domain of another tort, such 
as defamation, has also been treated as being significant.
149
 It may be, however, that in such a case these 
concerns may be addressed by focusing on the different interests protected by the different torts.
150
 
An economic analysis might focus on the economic notions of deterrence and better loss distribution as rele-
vant policy considerations.
151
 When applied in the psychiatric injury realm it has been argued that an eco-
nomic analysis approach is capable of reducing the miscellany of policy concerns into a single compound 
concern of reducing overall accident costs.
152
 Such an approach has been subjected to detailed rebuttal, which 
has argued (inter alia) that it is premised on people knowing what the law is and being motivated to take it 
into account when deciding how to behave. This might be unreasonable to expect outside of, for example, 
members of a profession who quickly become acquainted with conduct deemed to be culpable via means 
such as professional associations, by word of mouth, media reports or otherwise.
153
 It might also assume a 
large degree of conscious decision-making ability, which might be appropriate in the case of, for example, 
trauma in the workplace that may be preventable by safer work practices or environments but are much less 
so in the case of the momentary neglect that normally features in, for example, most motor vehicle acci-
dents.
154
 Finally, economic theory entirely ignores the significance today of the availability of liability insur-
ance and its effect on personal responsibility.
155
 
The availability or otherwise of insurance or other loss spreading device
156
 itself has not been addressed con-
sistently in courts in relation to whether it is a policy consideration relevant to negligence generally. Several 
High Court judges have rejected the availability of insurance or the possibility of loss spreading as valid con-
siderations in relation to the existence of a duty of care in pure economic loss cases.
157
 In the sphere of liabil-
ity for psychiatric injury in Australia and England the availability or non-availability of insurance, or loss 
spreading ability, was not a factor that overtly influenced the High Court's decision in Jaensch v Coffey
158
 nor 
  
the House of Lords in McLoughlin v O'Brian,
159
 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,
160
 or 
Page v Smith.
161
 This may be contrasted with US judges who have not been reticent in expressly referring to 
the availability of liability insurance when determining whether to extend liability for emotional distress.
162
  
The availability of insurance to the plaintiff may also be proffered as a reason for not expanding the limits of 
liability. Thus, it may be argued that a business claiming damages for pure economic loss may obtain a de-
gree of protection through insuring against a loss of profits. In White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
Police,
163
 some members of the House of Lords referred to the plaintiff employees' access to pension 
schemes as a reason for limiting liability. Australian courts considering claims arising from trauma in the 
workplace have not taken a similar stance.
164
 Further, the plaintiff in a psychiatric injury case could hardly be 
expected to insure himself or herself against what is for most a once-in-a-lifetime experience which may oc-
cur in an infinite variety of ways. 
 
4.  Balancing competing considerations 
It would be specious to believe that competing policy considerations could be arranged in a universally ap-
plicable ranking of importance.
165
 Such an exercise would presume a linear relationship that is antithetic to 
matters of qualitative and multi-dimensional character. Instead, what is demanded in any assessment of pol-
icy considerations, which in a given case may be simultaneously pulling in different directions, is striking a 
balance that is suited to the case at hand.
166
 The necessity for an individualised evaluation and balance of the 
considerations pertinent to a particular case is demonstrated by the fact that the same considerations are not 
applicable to all cases. Policy considerations relevant to a case of psychiatric injury caused by an erroneous 
statement
167
 are obviously different from those relevant to the same injury resulting from a motor vehicle 
accident.
168
 
There are some concerns, however, that may be considered as impacting upon the majority, if not all, cases 
of psychiatric injury for which general assessment may prove beneficial. Concerns regarding proof of the 
damage, including fears of fabrication of a relevant injury, are today of much less weight than they were in 
times of less sophisticated science, so much so that they may hardly warrant a foreclosure of all claims for 
psychiatric injury or even a curtailment of such claims. The decline in the influence of concerns regarding 
proof of damage as a consequence of expanding psychiatric knowledge and understanding has corresponded 
with a strengthening, for the same reason, of the notion that an individual suffering a psychological reaction 
following traumatic stress may be as disabled as, if not more disabled in some cases than, an individual suf-
fering physical injury. The imperative to vindicate the law's interest in the integrity of the psyche may ac-
cordingly be considered as strong as that for the integrity of physical security, at least in the case of a person 
suffering a pathological response and not merely transient effect. 
Floodgates arguments should not be summarily dismissed. The ubiquity of transient reactions means that to 
allow substantial recovery for such reactions would indeed impose a number of problems, including an over-
taxing of judicial resources with a resulting deleterious effect upon the administration of justice generally, 
the creation of disincentive for carrying on activities that involve a risk of prompting emotional reactions and 
the imposition of a limitless liability. Allowing recovery for mere emotional distress, as occurs in several US 
jurisdictions, rightly requires a counter-balance such as the clear, although arbitrary, delimitation of precon-
ditions for such recovery. The floodgates problem assumes lesser significance if, again, the threshold of 
compensable damage is fixed at a pathological reaction: present day psychiatric knowledge and understand-
ing, supporting concepts such as the widely accepted Horowitz prototype for the phases of psychological re-
sponse to traumatic stress, or even more recent notions of a difficult to reverse biological change, regard 
pathological reactions as rare occurrences.
169
 Besides the class of potential claimants reaching that threshold 
being small in number, a further factor mitigating fears of limitless liability would be for courts to pursue a 
line of moderate awards for general damages when compensating meritorious claims. If this were the case, 
then proceeding to also stipulate further limits on liability -- such as limiting the class of claimant, proximity 
to the accident and means of perception -- may appear to be overkill. 
  
Drawing 'bright lines', of course, has the virtue of certainty, and provides clear direction to those involved in 
the trial of claims. But such clear demarcation comes at the price of creating artificial, arbitrary and medi-
cally unsustainable distinctions between otherwise equally deserving claims. This then creates the risk of the 
law producing results that may be difficult to justify to the wider community. It is perhaps a measure of the 
degree of dissatisfaction in the community with the position adopted by the House of Lords in Alcock v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police  and  White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
170
 that the 
English Law Commission recommended that all bar one of the controls supported by the House -- the degree 
of relationship with the victim -- be abandoned. On the other hand, removal of all restrictions or guidelines 
for recovery may counter fears of capriciousness in the law, but do little for predictability. It does not be-
speak well of a legal system where not even legal advisers and trial judges know with some degree of cer-
tainty what is required by the law and the only time that litigants can be sure is when an appellate court 
makes a determination.  
'Bright lines' are not, however, the only means of achieving such a degree of certainty as practicable in a 
qualitative field involving questions of fact and degree. For example, pursuing an incremental approach, util-
ising where appropriate the tools of analogy, induction and deduction from previous cases, provides a meas-
ure of predictability that allows those involved in testing novel cases a solid foundation on which to proceed. 
Combined with an approach fixing the damage deemed worthy of compensation, it would be a way of ad-
dressing floodgates concerns while treating like cases alike. The question would then be whether, on an as-
sessment of the other policy concerns arising in the particular case, the corpus of recognised cases should be 
expanded to include the new case. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
It is clear that today courts are called upon to assess overtly competing policy considerations in novel cases. 
Claims for psychiatric injury will typically raise a range of common concerns. However, in the infinite vari-
ety of circumstances that may give rise to a claim a novel case may raise novel policy considerations. Ac-
cordingly, any abstract assessment of policy considerations, such as that undertaken in this article, must be 
subject to the rider that it cannot be regarded as a closed domain. 
Any exercise of balancing competing policy considerations will involve an assessment of the comparative 
influence of each concern. Using a standard of modern psychiatric knowledge, it is possible to make an as-
sessment regarding the commonly raised concerns. This reveals not only that some concerns that were con-
sidered paramount at the end of the nineteenth century are of much reduced significance at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, but also that it is possible -- by fixing the damage worthy of compensation at the 
level of the comparatively rare long-lasting pathological response -- to accommodate a variety of concerns 
which may be seen as pulling in different directions. In so doing, such an assessment may call into question 
the imposition of further artificial limits on liability of the kind currently supported in England and several 
US jurisdictions. 
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